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🇦🇱 Albania • Diella AI • OSINT Report

Diella: The AI Minister

World’s first AI cabinet appointment — technical OSINT analysis of infrastructure, Azure deployment, 110 AKSHI subdomains, and Vue.js bundle examination.

FRONTEND: CLEAN CONTEXT: CRITICAL 110 SUBDOMAINS OSINT PHASE 1 + 2

Overview

Diella (from Albanian diell — “sun”) is an AI system developed by AKSHI using Microsoft Azure and OpenAI technology. In September 2025, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama appointed Diella as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence — making her the world’s first AI formally appointed to a cabinet-level government position. Her stated mission: “Public tenders will be 100 percent free of corruption.”

This OSINT analysis covers the technical investigation of Diella’s infrastructure, AKSHI’s digital footprint, and the security assessment conducted in January and February 2026.

Identity & Background

AttributeDetail
NameDiella (from Albanian for “sun”)
AppearanceFemale avatar in traditional Zadrimë costume
VoiceAlbanian actress Anila Bisha
RoleMinister of State for Artificial Intelligence
DeveloperAKSHI Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Technology PartnerMicrosoft (Azure + OpenAI LLMs)
Initial launchJanuary 2025 — virtual assistant on e-Albania
Cabinet appointmentSeptember 2025 (presidential decree)
MissionAnti-corruption monitoring of public procurement
Document access36,000+ government documents
Service integration~1,000 public services on e-Albania

Infrastructure — Phase 1 (January 2026)

Primary Domains

DomainIP AddressASNTechnology
e-albania.al134.0.39.39AS5576 (AKSHI)ASP.NET, jQuery, Bootstrap
akshi.gov.al134.0.42.170AS5576 (AKSHI)WordPress, nginx/1.19.10
Diella Frontendproud-coast-026495803.4.azurestaticapps.netAzureVue.js 3.5 / Quasar

Diella Frontend Analysis

The Diella AI chatbot is served as an Azure Static Web App. The 229 KB JavaScript bundle (index.0c3452c3.js) was downloaded and fully analyzed. No API keys, no backend endpoint URLs, no hardcoded credentials were found. All sensitive configuration is injected at runtime by the Azure backend.

FindingResult
API keys in bundleNone found
Backend endpoint URLsNone found (runtime-injected)
Hardcoded credentialsNone found
Environment variables exposedStyle/UI variables only (non-sensitive)
Azure App Insights key40a2cf63-ce16-4617-afe4-c618d01198ef (telemetry)
Last-Modified dateSeptember 15, 2025 (matches cabinet appointment)
FrameworkVue.js 3.5.13 / Quasar Framework (#q-app div)

Azure Static Web App authentication endpoints responded as expected:

GET /.auth/me
{"clientPrincipal": null}

GET /.auth/login/aad
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://login.microsoftonline.com/...

AKSHI Internal Subdomain Infrastructure

AKSHI’s backend infrastructure (referenced in Diella’s configuration but served via internal DNS) was identified through certificate transparency logs:

All internal subdomains return no DNS resolution from the public internet, confirming proper network segmentation.

AKSHI Subdomain Enumeration

Phase 1 (January 2026): 50 Subdomains

Initial enumeration via crt.sh certificate transparency produced 50 AKSHI subdomains. Key infrastructure discovered:

SubdomainPurposeStatus
e-albania.alMain citizen services portalLIVE
eauth.akshi.gov.alAuthentication servicesInternal
esign.akshi.gov.alElectronic signaturesIncapsula WAF
eform.akshi.gov.alElectronic formsDefault IIS page
code-server.akshi.gov.alVS Code Server (dev)Internal only
collabora.akshi.gov.alCollabora Online documentsInternal only
dc-hasura.akshi.gov.alHasura GraphQLInternal only
dc-keycloak.akshi.gov.alKeycloak IAMInternal only

Phase 2 (February 2026): 110 Subdomains (+60 new)

A second crt.sh enumeration expanded the count from 50 to 110 subdomains. Notable additions:

All new subdomains are internal-only or return blocking responses. No new public attack surface was discovered in Phase 2 on AKSHI’s own infrastructure.

AKSHI Security Assessment

TargetFindingAssessment
akshi.gov.al (WordPress)REST API returns 401 for all authenticated endpointsHardened
akshi.gov.alUser enumeration disabledHardened
akshi.gov.alWAF blocks .env, wp-config.php.bak, xmlrpc.phpHardened
akshi.gov.al/readme.htmlWordPress version information potentially exposedLow risk
Diella frontend bundleNo credentials or API keys foundClean
crt.sh subdomain visibility110 subdomains visible in certificate transparencyInfo disclosure
Internal infrastructureKeycloak, Hasura, Jira, Rancher — all internal-onlyProperly segmented

The “83 Children” Initiative

In October 2025, PM Rama announced that Diella is “pregnant” with 83 digital assistants — one for each ruling-party Member of Parliament. These AI parliamentary assistants are planned to:

Expected operational date: end of 2026. If deployed, Albania’s parliament would become the most comprehensively AI-monitored legislature in the world. The same parliament whose backend API exposed every MP’s PII and 54,545 documents without authentication.

Contextual Questions

The technical security of Diella’s own infrastructure is, in isolation, competent. But the institutional context raises questions that technical audits cannot answer:

An anti-corruption AI built by a corrupt agency, monitoring a parliament with an unauthenticated API, and trained on data from systems breached by a foreign intelligence service. The technical surface is hardened. Everything around it is not.

Sources

Methodology: All infrastructure data was gathered through passive OSINT — public DNS resolution, certificate transparency (crt.sh), HTTP header inspection of public endpoints, and JavaScript bundle analysis. No authentication was bypassed. No systems were accessed beyond their public-facing web interfaces.

Research: January 25, 2026 (Phase 1) + February 25, 2026 (Phase 2) — ODINT Albania Investigation