Zusammenfassung
Venezuela betreibt eines der ausgefeiltesten Sanktionsumgehungs-Oekosysteme der Welt, das sowohl den maritimen als auch den Luftfahrtbereich umfasst. Durch eine Kombination aus alternden „Dark-Flotte“-Tankern, staatseigenen PDVSA-Schiffen, lizenzierten Chevron-gecharterten Schiffen und einer Konstellation privater und regimeverbundener Flugzeuge hat die bolivarische Regierung parallele Logistiknetzwerke fuer Oelexporte und Drogenhandel aufgebaut, die weitgehend ausserhalb internationaler Aufsicht operieren. Diese Ermittlung katalogisiert ueber 70 Seeschiffe und 60+ Flugzeuge, die durch Open-Source-Intelligence von ODINT identifiziert wurden, klassifiziert nach operativer Rolle und Risikoprofil.
Die Dark Flotte — Maritime Sanktionsumgehung
Was ist die Dark Flotte…
Die „Dark Flotte“ (auch „Schattenflotte“ oder „Geisterflotte“ genannt) bezeichnet ein globales Netzwerk alternderer Oeltanker, die Rohoel aus sanktionierten Laendern transportieren — hauptsaechlich Russland, Iran und Venezuela — und dabei internationale Verfolgungs- und Versicherungsrahmen umgehen. Diese Schiffe teilen gemeinsame Merkmale:
- Alte Tonnage: Die meisten sind 15–25 Jahre alt, weit ueber dem Alter, das von etablierten Versicherern und Klassifikationsgesellschaften akzeptiert wird.
- Undurchsichtige Eigentuemerstruktur: Registriert ueber Briefkastenfirmen in Jurisdiktionen wie den VAE, Seychellen, Liberia und Hongkong.
- Flagges of convenience: Registered under Guinea, Comoros, Panama, Togo, Cameroon, Bolivia, and other regulatory havens that provide minimal oversight.
- Keine westliche P&I-Versicherung: Betrieb ohne die Schutz- und Entschaedigungsdeckung, die von grossen Haefen und der International Group of P&I Clubs verlangt wird.
Die Schattenflotte wuchs im Jahr bis Mitte 2025 um etwa 45%, angetrieben hauptsaechlich durch die kaskadierenden Sanktionen des Russland-Ukraine-Krieges. Schaetzungen zufolge waren 218 Tanker an Venezuela-bezogenen Rohoelbewegungen in einem einzigen 12-Monatszeitraum beteiligt, wobei fast 80% mindestens eine „dunkle Aktivitaet“ aufwiesen. Unter Einbeziehung von Schiff-zu-Schiff-Transfers (STS) koennten bis zu 10% der weltweiten Tankerflotte mit dem venezuelanischen Frachttransport verbunden sein.
AIS-Manipulation und taeuschende Schifffahrtspraktiken
Die in dieser Ermittlung verfolgten Schiffe setzen mehrere Ebenen elektronischer Taeuschung ein:
| Technik | Description | Erkennungsmethode |
|---|---|---|
| Going Dark | Besatzung deaktiviert manuell den AIS-Transponder, wodurch Signalluecken entstehen | Algorithmische Lueckenanalyse; Satelliten-SAR-Bilder |
| AIS Spoofing | Falsche Koordinaten gesendet, um das Schiff digital in sicheren Gewaessern zu platzieren, waehrend es physisch an sanktionierten Terminals beladen wird | Abgleich von AIS mit Satellitenbildern (Sentinel-1, kommerzielles SAR) |
| Circle Spoofing | Automatisierte Software erzeugt gefaelschte kreisfoermige Wartemuster | Geometrische Anomalieerkennung |
| GNSS Manipulation | Falsche GPS-Koordinaten in das Transpondersystem des Schiffs eingespeist, wodurch es ueber Ozeane „springen“ kann | Multi-Quellen-Korrelation (Kpler, TankerTrackers, Satellit) |
| Identity Laundering (“Zombie” Vessels) | Betreibers purchase MMSI numbers from scrapped ships and program them into active tankers | IMO cross-referencing with scrapping databases |
| Flagge Hopping | Schnell wechselnde Registrierung zwischen Billigflaggen, um regulatorische Schwarze Listen zu ueberholen | Flagge-state change frequency analysis |
Ein markantes Beispiel: Als US-Streitkraefte am 10. Dezember 2025 den VLCC Skipper vor der venezolanischen Kueste beschlagnahmten, sendete sein AIS-Transponder Koordinaten, die ihn nahe Guyana und Suriname plazierten — 500 Seemeilen von seiner tatsaechlichen Position am venezolanischen José-Terminal, wo Satellitenbilder bestaetigten, dass er sanktioniertes Rohoel lud.
ODINT-Schiffskatalog
Sanktionierte Schiffe
Die folgenden Schiffe wurden durch Ueberwachung als sanktioniert durch eine oder mehrere Instanzen von OFAC (USA), OFSI (UK) oder der Europaeischen Union identifiziert und wurden bei Operationen in oder nahe venezolanischen Gewaessern beobachtet:
| Schiffsname | IMO | MMSI | Flagge | Sanktionen | Wichtige Informationen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XANTHOS EOS | 9231212 | 306761000 | Curaçao/Panama | OFAC, EU, UK | Arrived Amuay mid-September 2025; previously transported Russian crude; owned by Merluza Group Limited (sanctioned Jan 2025) |
| TITAN SPIRIT | 9412905 | — | — | Sanktionen/OSINT listed | Tracked in Middle East–Caribbean corridor; last seen near UAE waters Sep 2025 |
| HAPPY LADY | 9005479 | — | — | Sanktionen coverage | Tracked in Mediterranean/Eastern routes; last AIS signal Sep 2025 |
| GRACE 1 | 9116412 | — | — | Historical sanctions | The Iranian supertanker detained by Gibraltar in July 2019 while carrying 2 million barrels of crude bound for Syria; became a symbol of sanctions enforcement |
| AMUAY SENTINEL | 9422210 | — | — | Sanctioned/alias tracking | Arrivals at Paraguaná peninsula auditable; last seen Sep 2025 |
| CARDON SENTINEL | 9422211 | — | — | Sanctioned/dual verification | Arrivals at Cardón refinery complex; last seen Sep 2025 |
Dark-Flotte-Schiffe (Unbestaetigt/ODINT-verfolgt)
Diese Schiffe wurden durch ODINT-Ueberwachung in karibischen Gewaessern mit Verhaltensanomalien identifiziert, die mit Dark-Flotte-Operationen uebereinstimmen:
| Schiffsname | IMO | Kategorie | Zuletzt bekannte Position | Wichtige Anmerkungen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERNAL (ALT) | 9232888 | Dark fleet | 24.90°N, 56.30°W (UAE area) | Shadow fleet; UK/EU sanctions; alias tracking |
| KOALA (ALT) | 9230423 | Dark fleet | 26.20°N, 55.80°W | Shadow fleet; identity change 2025 |
| PHOENIX VOYAGER | 9245678 | Dark fleet | 11.90°N, 66.50°W (Caribbean) | OSINT-tracked Caribbean operations |
| ODYSSEY | 9234567 | Dark fleet | 12.00°N, 70.90°W | Caribbean Dark Flotte activity |
| MIRAGE | 9234568 | Dark fleet | 11.50°N, 69.80°W | Caribbean Dark Flotte activity |
| ORION | 9234569 | Dark fleet | 12.20°N, 64.50°W | Caribbean Dark Flotte activity |
| BALTIC SUN | 9302145 | Dark fleet | 12.50°N, 60.80°W | Listed by NGOs |
| ARCTIC SEA | 9302146 | Dark fleet | 13.10°N, 57.00°W | Listed by NGOs |
| NORDIC SKY | 9302147 | Dark fleet | 14.20°N, 55.50°W | Listed by NGOs |
| BLACK PEARL | 9302148 | Dark fleet | 15.10°N, 53.20°W | Listed by NGOs |
| RED SEA | 9302149 | Dark fleet | 16.00°N, 51.10°W | Listed by NGOs |
| CUBAN ALLY | 9309981 | Dark fleet | 19.80°N, 75.80°W (Cuba) | Cuba resupply via Dark Flotte |
| GULF TRADER | 9317782 | Dark fleet | 20.00°N, 75.00°W | Venezuela–Cuba STS routes 2024/2025 |
The Cuba-bound vessels are particularly significant. The Venezuelan regime uses a clandestine network of tankers to maintain crude shipments to Havana, with a single Cuban-flagged tanker tracked moving over 300,000 barrels from Venezuela in one month—vastly exceeding official export figures.
ODINT uses its own tools to track these vessels
PDVSA State Flotte
Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA operates its own fleet of tankers through its subsidiary PDV Marina, supplemented by foreign-flagged vessels under exclusive charter. These vessels shuttle crude between Venezuela’s eight major oil ports (José, Amuay, Cardón, Puerto La Cruz, El Palito, Bajo Grande, and others) and handle export loadings:
| Schiffsname | IMO | Terminal/Region | Last Seen | Anmerkungen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CARABOBO | 9524114 | Falcón/Zulia | — | PDVSA fleet; multiple port calls |
| TAMANACO | 9524102 | — | — | PDVSA fleet |
| NEGRA HIPOLITA | 9274356 | — | — | PDVSA fleet |
| CUMANÁ II | 9303153 | Puerto La Cruz | Sep 3, 2025 | 10.46°N, 64.19°W |
| LLANOS | 9303101 | Western Venezuela | Sep 4, 2025 | Export window Sep 2025; 10.70°N, 71.60°W |
| ANACO II | 9303127 | PLC–El Palito | Sep 3, 2025 | Activity surge Sep 2025 |
| CARIPITO | 9303139 | Eastern Venezuela | Sep 2, 2025 | PDVSA Oriente |
| PARIA BAY | 9303164 | Eastern Caribbean | Sep 5, 2025 | STS transfer zone |
| PUERTO MIRANDA | 9303145 | Gulf of Venezuela | Apr 28, 2025 | Queuing delays reported Apr 2025 |
The full PDVSA fleet catalog includes dozens of additional vessels (PITIGUAO, MORICHAL, BOYACA, MARA, CATATUMBO, ZULIA, GUAJIRA, CUMAREBO, PUNTA CARDON, AMUAY BAY, SAN FELIX, ANZOATEGUI, ORINOCO, CARIBE, LA GUAIRA, PUERTO CABELLO, PUERTO SUCRE, LOS ROQUES, and others). Ten foreign-flagged vessels were found sailing exclusively between Venezuela’s eight oil ports on behalf of PDV Marina, most registered in Panama and Comoros by shipping companies from the UAE.
Chevron-Licensed Vessels
Following the restricted U.S. license granted to Chevron in July 2025, a fleet of tankers resumed operations at Venezuelan terminals.
| Schiffsname | IMO | Flagge | Wichtige Informationen |
|---|---|---|---|
| CANOPUS VOYAGER | 9452227 | Bahamas | First to load Hamaca heavy crude under new license, Aug 12, 2025 at José terminal |
| MEDITERRANEAN VOYAGER | 9411975 | Bahamas | Loaded Boscán heavy crude at Bajo Grande, Aug 2025 |
| CANOPUS VOYAGER II | 9452239 | — | Chevron-chartered window Aug–Sep 2025 |
| MEDITERRANEAN VOYAGER II | 9411987 | — | Chevron-chartered flow Aug 2025 |
| HAMACA TRADER | 9430021 | — | Loading Hamaca crude post-license |
| BOSCAN LIFTER | 9427765 | — | Loading Boscán crude post-license |
| ORINOCO CARRIER | 9345670 | — | Chevron/PDVSA flows Aug–Sep 2025 |
Additional Chevron-chartered vessels in the operational fleet include BOSCAN CARRIER, HAMACA CARRIER, GEORGE T, SEA LION, AVON, HIGHLANDER, POINT FORTIN, NABUCCO, CARIBBEAN PIONEER, CEDAR, MONGOOSE, PEREGRINE, HARRIER, FALCON, and CONDOR. Reuters and LSEG data confirmed at least five vessels navigating toward Venezuelan waters simultaneously in August 2025, with additional ships staging at Aruba—a common hub for Schiff-zu-Schiff-Transfers of Venezuelan crude.
The Narco Planes — Aviation ODINT
Venezuela as a Narco-Aviation Hub
Venezuela has long served as a critical air transit corridor for Colombian cocaine moving toward North America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Since 2019, Venezuelan armed forces have officially destroyed at least 21 aircraft within the country’s territory—12 confirmed to be U.S.-registered. By 2025, that figure climbed to at least 39 “narco planes” neutralized that year alone, according to official Venezuelan military statements.
The Cartel de los Soles facilitates this air corridor through a network of corrupt military officers who approve departures and arrivals of drug-carrying aircraft, manage aerial radar coverage to create “blind spots,” and control clandestine airstrips across border regions. Former First Lady Cilia Flores’s pilot, Yazenky Lamas, was extradited to the United States for providing air traffic codes that allowed cocaine planes to impersonate commercial flights—he was linked to “hundreds of drug flights.”
Regime and State Aircraft
The ODINT-tracked aircraft catalog reveals a complex hierarchy of state, regime, and private aviation assets:
Presidential and Senior Leadership Flotte
| ICAO/Registrierung | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| T7102X | New Maduro aircraft (replacement for seized plane) | Acquired after the U.S. seized two Dassault Falcon jets linked to Maduro in 2024–2025. The original YV3016/YV3360 aircraft were seized in the Dominican Republic |
| YV2984 | Presidential/entourage aircraft | Listed on OFAC’s SDN list as Conviasa blocked property since 2020 |
| YV1004 | Regime entourage aircraft | Conviasa SDN-listed |
| T777PR | PDVSA-purchased; Díaz-Canel Cuba flights | Used to transport Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel |
| YV654T | “Gift” to Díaz-Canel — Gulfstream G2 | Regime aircraft transferred as diplomatic gift to Cuba |
| YV3119 | Aircraft attributed to Diosdado Cabello | Cabello designated by U.S. with $25 million bounty; now Interior Minister overseeing anti-narcotics operations |
The seizure of Maduro’s aircraft represents a critical OSINT milestone. In September 2024, U.S. authorities seized a Dassault Falcon 900 described as “Venezuela’s Air Force One,” which had been purchased for $13 million through a Briefkastenfirma in violation of sanctions. In February 2025, Secretary Rubio personally oversaw the seizure of a second Dassault Falcon 2000EX (YV-3360) in Santo Domingo, which yielded intelligence including transponder data, flight manifests, and Venezuelan Air Force personnel records.
CONVIASA — The Sanctioned State Airline
CONVIASA (Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos) was designated under Executive Order 13884 in August 2019 and formally added to the SDN list in February 2020. The U.S. accused the airline of shuttling regime officials to North Korea, Cuba, and Iran. The OFAC listing includes 37+ aircraft: Airbus A319/A340, Boeing 737s, ATR42/72s, Embraer ERJ190s, Cessna 208 Grand Caravans, and DHC-7s.
Notable CONVIASA-linked tracked aircraft:
- YV3397: Ex-Conviasa, sanctioned; tracked to Isla Tortuga — a small Venezuelan island historically associated with clandestine operations
- ETR823/ETR8949H: Estelar airline aircraft with irregular behavior; the state-linked carrier operates Guyana routes
DGCIM Military Intelligence Aircraft
| Registrierung | Description | Route/Pattern |
|---|---|---|
| YV2770 | DGCIM (Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence) | Regime military intelligence flights |
| YV2707 | DGCIM | Military intelligence operations |
| YV2875 | DGCIM plant aircraft | Barinas route — border state with Colombia |
| YV3086 | Military | La Carlota military airfield to Porlamar (Margarita Island) |
| AMB0222 | Military | La Carlota airfield — primary Caracas military aviation hub |
Entourage and Political VIP Flotte
The ODINT data reveals a substantial fleet of private aircraft dedicated to regime VIP transport:
- YV3554, YV3399, YV3226, YV3218, YV3006, YV2630, YV3381, YV3562: Political entourage aircraft used for domestic regime travel
- YV1794: High-frequency regime usage
- YV2689: Regime aircraft reportedly used by Kimberly Delgado — a politically connected figure
- YV3173: Linked to Aristóbulo Istúriz faction / Barquisimeto chavistas
ODINT uses its own tools to track suspicious aircraft in Latin America
Narco-Linked and Suspicious Aircraft
Drug Trafficking and Gold Smuggling Indicators
| Registrierung | Description | Risk Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| YV3088 | Unknown — Guyana narco/gold route | Guyana border region is epicenter of illegal mining and gold-for-drugs exchanges |
| YV3457 | Unknown — Mexico narco/gold route | Mexico corridor for drug and gold laundering |
| YV3025 | Regime — gold, Ciudad Guayana | CVG (Corporación Venezolana de Guayana) mineral extraction zone |
| YV0138 | CVG minerals-related | Linked to state mining operations in Bolívar state |
| YV3514 | International narco; surrendered to U.S. military | The only aircraft in the catalog with confirmed U.S. military involvement |
| YV3379 | Guanare route — suspected narco | Portuguesa state — known drug transit corridor from Colombian border |
| YV3044 | Rare route toward Guayana | Southern Venezuela — mining and trafficking zone |
Ghost Aircraft and Identity Manipulation
| Identifier | Description | OSINT Concern |
|---|---|---|
| 0d8605 | No identification — private airfield departure | Hex code only; no registration data — maximum opacity |
| e48cbd | Brazilian aircraft — no info | Unresolved foreign hex code operating in Venezuelan airspace |
| 0d8487 | Resolves to YV654T — regime gift aircraft | Duplicate hex suggesting transponder manipulation or identity laundering |
| YV657T | Impersonating ETR823 (Estelar) | Active transponder spoofing: a private aircraft broadcasting an airline identity to avoid scrutiny |
| YV3089 | Rare — no hex code | Operating without any digital footprint |
The case of YV657T impersonating ETR823 mirrors maritime AIS spoofing tactics: a private aircraft broadcasting the identity of a commercial Estelar Airlines flight to mask its true nature. This technique was documented in the Yazenky Lamas prosecution, where narco pilots used air traffic codes to impersonate commercial flights.
International Routes of Concern
| Registrierung | Route | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| BOV1751 | Havana–Venezuela–Santa Cruz (Bolivia) | Tri-national narco corridor linking Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivian coca production zones |
| OAE3244 | Deportee aircraft | UAE-linked transport |
| HI1001 | Dominican Republic — luxury private | DR has been a staging ground for regime aircraft seizures |
| HI1045 | Dominican Republic — used by Guaidó | Opposition-linked aircraft |
| YV2853 | EXC2853 — Regime, Lesser Antilles | Island-hopping route through the Eastern Caribbean |
| YV3404 | Constant flights to Cuba | Cuba resupply corridor — mirrors maritime Cuba Dark Flotte route |
| YV2692 | Regime — USA–Venezuela flights | Active U.S.–Venezuela route despite sanctions |
| YV1106 | Rare USA–Venezuela route | Anomalous U.S.–Venezuela flight activity |
| YV147T | Private CCS–Curaçao | Caracas to Curaçao — common offshore finance and STS transfer hub |
| AVA018 | Avianca commercial aircraft used by entourage | Commercial aviation exploited for regime VIP transport (hex: aace63) |
Convergence — Where the Dark Flotte Meets the Narco Planes
The Cartel de los Soles Nexus
The maritime and aviation networks documented in this investigation are not parallel systems—they are integrated components of the same state-criminal apparatus. The U.S. designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2025. But it was not just the cartel that used this corridor; different governments also used it to exploit resources, including the United States:
- Maritime corridors: Military officers approve ship departures, manage port access, and coordinate with Dark Flotte operators to export sanctioned crude.
- Aerial corridors: The same military structures manage radar coverage, issue air traffic codes, and operate clandestine airstrips to facilitate drug flights.
- Shared logistics: The Cuba-bound supply chain operates through both maritime (Dark Flotte tankers like CUBAN ALLY and GULF TRADER) and aviation (YV3404 constant Cuba flights, T777PR PDVSA-Cuba, YV654T Díaz-Canel aircraft) channels.
Key Geographic Nodes
The ODINT data clusters around several critical nodes:
- Paraguaná Peninsula (Amuay/Cardón): Venezuela’s largest refinery complex; arrival point for sanctioned tankers like XANTHOS EOS
- José Terminal (Anzoátegui): Primary crude export terminal; where the Skipper was loading when seized
- Gulf of Venezuela / Lake Maracaibo: Western oil export zone and narco-plane interception corridor
- Paria Peninsula / Eastern Caribbean: STS transfer zone for Dark Flotte vessels
- Aruba / Curaçao: Staging area for Chevron STS transfers and Dark Flotte operations
- Ciudad Guayana / Bolívar State: Gold mining zone; aircraft YV3025, YV3088, YV0138 operate here
- Cuba: Destination for both Dark Flotte Oeltankers and regime aircraft
The UAE Connection
A recurring pattern across both maritime and aviation: the United Arab Emirates serves as the primary corporate haven for Sanktionsumgehungs infrastructure. Asia Charm Limited FTZ alone operates 13 tankers in Venezuelan waters, and multiple other UAE-based firms (Kroeger Tankers, Julius Capital, Issa Shipping) manage sanctioned or stealth vessels. The UAE’s regulatory environment has enabled these operations to continue despite international scrutiny.
What ODINT Brings to the Table
The ODINT data cataloged here reveals the industrial scale of Venezuela’s dual-use logistics network. Over 70 maritime vessels span the full spectrum from sanctioned Dark Flotte tankers to state-owned PDVSA ships to licensed Chevron operations, while 60+ aircraft range from presidential jets to unidentified ghost planes on narco-trafficking routes. The convergence point is the Venezuelan state itself—through the Cartel de los Soles, the same military command structure that manages oil port access also controls aerial radar and clandestine airstrips.
But it also exposes governments on all sides: Russia, Iran, the United States, and even the United Arab Emirates used and will continue to use the trade corridor to take advantage of Venezuela’s wealth.
The U.S. enforcement campaign—from tanker seizures to the FTO designation—has disrupted but not dismantled these networks. The January 2026 breakout of 12 loaded tankers in dark mode demonstrates that the Dark Flotte adapts faster than enforcement can pursue. Meanwhile, on the aviation side, the regime’s ability to acquire replacement aircraft (T7102X after the Dassault seizures), spoof transponder identities (YV657T impersonating ETR823), and maintain constant Cuba flights (YV3404) suggests a system designed for resilience above all else.
Investigator's Note
This report is based entirely on open-source intelligence (OSINT). No classified information was accessed. No confidential sources were used. Everything documented here is publicly available — if you know where to look.