Radio Venezuela
Military & regime communications intelligence — 130+ HF frequencies, satellite infrastructure, air defense systems, and the five-country spy pipeline.
The most comprehensive OSINT map of Venezuela's military comms ever assembled.
About This Investigation
Radio Venezuela documents the complete communications architecture of the Venezuelan military and regime — from HF radio frequencies used by infantry divisions and naval vessels, to satellite ground stations with Chinese remote access, to the five-country intelligence pipeline linking China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. The investigation draws from 140+ open sources including military frequency databases, satellite imagery, leaked documents from the Guacamaya hack, and OSINT analysis of telecom infrastructure.
The Five-Country Intelligence Pipeline
China provides radars, surveillance tech, and satellite ground stations with remote access. Cuba runs analysis and correlation centers in Havana (Lourdes/Bejucal SIGINT stations). Venezuela enforces domestically through DGCIM/SEBIN. Russia modernizes Cuban surveillance infrastructure. Iran manufactures fiber optic equipment (Venefibra) and supplies missile boats. Venezuelan intelligence data flows through Havana. Chinese radar feeds from SINDA are shared with Cuba. The physical backbone: ALBA-1 — a 1,630 km submarine cable running directly from La Guaira to Siboney, Cuba.
Military Communications
HF radio frequencies and ALE identifiers across all branches
| Branch | HF Frequencies | ALE Identifiers | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Army | 45+ | 50+ | 5 infantry divisions + General Staff |
| Navy | 70+ | 80+ | All operations, 25+ vessel call signs |
| Cross-branch shared | 3 confirmed | — | 7849.0, 10272.0, 10600.0 kHz |
| ALE Networks | — | 4 networks | Riverine HQ, Riverine Forces, Coast Guard, Riverine Ops |
| Aeronautical | 16 | — | Caracas VHF, HF aero, Caribbean VOLMET |
Air Defense Systems
Chinese and Russian systems — all failed during Jan 2026 US operation
| System | Origin | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
JY-27A (12+) | China | VHF radar | Failed |
S-300VM | Russia | Long-range SAM | Not connected to radar |
BUK M-2 | Russia | Medium-range SAM | Not connected to radar |
FK-3 | China | Medium-range SAM | Failed |
S-125 Pechora | Russia | Short-range SAM | Failed |
Igla-S / RBS-70 | Russia / Sweden | MANPADS | Not engaged |
Satellite & Telecom Infrastructure
A dead $390M satellite and American replacements
| Asset | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| VeneSat-1 (Simón Bolívar) | DEAD | Chinese-built, tumbling in space since March 2020. 28 transponders, $390M — all lost |
| Intelsat 14 | Active | American satellite — replaced VeneSat-1 for state media (C-band, 45°W) |
| Intelsat 35e | Active | FTA Venezuela satellite TV (11110 MHz, DVB-S2, 34.5°W) |
| Baemari Ground Station | Active | Inside military airbase. China has remote access |
| CANTV | Active | State telecom, 70-80% of internet. ZTE/Huawei backbone |
| CEIEC Great Firewall | Active | Chinese DPI, keyword filtering, metadata collection for CANTV |
| ALBA-1 Cable | Active | 1,630 km submarine cable: La Guaira → Siboney, Cuba |
Interactive Report
Full interactive HTML report with all findings
Raw Data Downloads
Source page dumps, master reference document, and research sources
Published Articles
Investigation coverage and analysis